How about @ahmadkhan111 – who seems to be dissing this post here and in other Tweets: https://twitter.com/#!/ahmadkhan111/statuses/151885339164803072 ? Same manual “fellow traveller” rather than official feed?

This sounds odd to me – partly because the strategy sounds like an awful idea and partly because this does not sound like something learned in Iraq.

In Iraq, we generally viewed the insurgency in terms of “reconcilables” and “irreconcilables.” The latter were those individuals/cells/organizations whom we needed to kill or capture. The former were those whom we attempted to co-opt/reconcile for temporary alliances from which to obtain short-term tactical gains, in hopes of reshaping the battlefield for longer-term operational/strategic gains. There was no attempt to “radicalize” either group.

I wonder if people misspeak when they say they’re attempting to “radicalize.” I wonder if they are really attempting to “instill paranoia.” That was certainly something that we put great emphasis upon in Iraq, to great effect. Instilling or exacerbating paranoia is done with the intent of causing violence, but within network (not indiscriminate violence, or violence against civilians or friendly combatants). The sequence in which we targeted individuals was often as much due to our perception of their value as it was due to our belief in how targeting that individual would cause or exacerbate paranoia within the network.

Example: Target A is in command of Network X. Target B would likely take command of Network X, if Target A were eliminated. Target A has heard rumors that Target B is sharing intelligence with Coalition forces, so that Target A will be eliminated and Target B can take control of Network X (sometimes this is a rumor we start; sometimes it is just the standard rumor-mongering among the insurgents). We cannot locate Target A, but we know he often leaves his phone with a courier (they knew some details about our ability to track/trace/tap phones). We conduct a raid to capture his courier. Target A, now even more paranoid about rumors that Target B is out to get him, kills Target B. Infighting ensues within the network as more rumors spread about whom was allied with A or B. The network’s command and control breaks down. Their OPSEC measures get more sloppy. We locate Target A and kill him. There is brief turmoil within the network to identify a new leader. A meeting of subordinate leaders takes place to re-establish command and control. We are tipped off about the meeting and detain everyone. The network is effectively destroyed. (This isn’t just a hypo – this occurred).

I am not really sure what is achieved, or hoped to be achieved, by “radicalizing.” I suppose it could “drive a wedge” between the people and the insurgency, but I find it difficult to believe that even the dumbest staff officer would buy into that boneheaded concept. It seems that it will only result in greater misery, greater dissatisfaction with the GIRoA and ISAF, make it more difficult to obtain intelligence from locals, and make it more difficult to accomplish anything.

We already have tools to “drive a wedge” between the people and the Taliban. They are Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, MISO (aka PSYOP), humanitarian assistance, MEDCAPs, infrastructure projects such as those performed with CERP, and, thankfully, programs administered outside of military channels, such as the National Solidarity Program. We “drive a wedge” between the people and Taliban by highlighting Taliban atrocities, not encouraging them, and by attempting to contrast what Taliban rule looks like (illiteracy, disease, impunity, lack of opportunity) with what GIRoA governance could look like (education, vaccinations, justice, and jobs).

Any military officer who thinks that deliberately encouraging radicalization is a good idea is a moron. If that individual further claims that he is doing so because that was a lesson learned in Iraq, then he needs choke himself.

I have a question though: How do you manage all your information streams? It’s something that I am constantly struggling with.

PS. Good luck with the book launch! Let me know if I can be of any assistance.